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ABSTRACT 
 
American farmers agree that the current 2014 Farm Bill Title I safety net programs are effective 
and have worked as they were designed.  However, due to steadily declining crop prices and 
difficult agricultural economic times, there is a growing need for improvement of the timing of 
Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) payments.  In the current 
state of the American agricultural economy, it is becoming increasingly more difficult for 
farmers to cash flow and to obtain operating loans from lenders.  For this reason, Congress is 
working to find a solution in the upcoming 2018 Farm Bill so farmers can be paid sooner than 
they are under the current farm bill.  This research was conducted at the request of the Chief 
Economist of the House Agricultural Committee, Bart Fischer.   
The objective of this study was to evaluate alternative payment timing options by 
calculating a new marketing year average (MYA) price series for determining PLC and ARC 
payments.  A stochastic simulation model was used to estimate the probability of triggering 
commodity program payments for the baseline and four alternative formulas for calculating 
MYA prices.  Several outcomes were examined with attention primarily focused on the 
forecasted 2017 MYA prices for the baseline and alternatives, the 2017 forecasted ARC 
government payments, and the 2017 forecasted PLC government payments.   
Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) analysis results indicated that 
most farmers prefer the Last Twelve First Five (L12F5) alternative because it has the overall 
highest program payments, but overall farmers are undecided on which alternative price series 
they prefer.  Additionally, the results for the 12-month baseline price series is preferred by 
taxpayers because it has the lowest amount of government payments.  It is important to note that 
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there is not a single alternative that both producers and taxpayers agree upon, therefore, no 
assumptions may be drawn at this point and farther analysis is needed.   
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the first farm bill, has provided relief for American 
farmers and ranchers in hard economic times since its inception in 1933.  It was created during 
the Great Depression to provide market stabilization by means of limiting the supply of 
commodities produced.  Today however, the Title I program is “designed to provide specific 
forms of income assistance without interfering with the market and is compatible with our free 
trade goals and obligations under the World Trade Organization” (“Farm Bill” par. 5).  Since its 
inception, it has continued to evolve to meet the ever-changing needs of producers.  The most 
recent 2014 Farm Bill was no exception; in it, several changes were adopted.   
The most significant change in the 2014 bill was the elimination of direct and counter-
cyclical payments (Wallace, Siobhan).  This included the Direct Payments (DP), Counter 
Cyclical Payments (CCP), and Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) programs.  Direct 
payments were designed to provide income support that was independent of production or prices 
(Outlaw et al. 2008, pp 13).  The CCP program “provided payments to producers on historical 
base acres and yields but were triggered by movements in current prices,” and the ACRE 
program made “payments to producers when their revenues fell below benchmark levels” (“Crop 
Commodity Program” par. 1).  In 2014, direct payments, ARCE and CCP, were replaced with 
two new revenue loss assistance programs, Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk 
Coverage (ARC).  Under PLC and ARC, producers must incur losses to receive income 
assistance payouts.   
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The 2014 Farm Bill has worked well by providing real relief to farmers and ranchers 
when they need it most.  However, there is room for reform in some areas of the upcoming 2018 
Farm Bill, specifically, the timing of PLC and ARC payments.  Several industry representatives 
testifying before the Agricultural Committees of the United States Senate and House of 
Representatives in farm bill hearings mentioned the need to receive safety net payments on a 
more timely basis.  Currently, producer safety net payments are based on the marketing year 
average (MYA) price for each commodity.  The MYA price is calculated as the weighted 
average using the national monthly prices for the commodity, weighted by monthly marketings, 
beginning at harvest and ending prior to the next year’s harvest.  As a result, safety net payments 
for the current year crop cannot be made until the marketing year ends, roughly 14 months after 
the crop is harvested.  When writing the 2014 Farm Bill, due to political and budgetary 
considerations, lawmakers had to shift payments under the Title 1 programs until after the 
subsequent fiscal year, which is after the crop year has concluded (National Association of 
Wheat Growers, pp 5).  The timing decision has made it difficult for producers to obtain annual 
operating loans.   
Each year, to secure operating loans, farmers must prepare a farm plan for their banks 
showing their farm will generate a positive cash flow with the expected revenue from the crop 
mix they plan to plant as well as what they expect to pay for inputs, rent, machinery and/or land 
payments, and living expenses (National Barley Growers Association, pp 2).  The Chairman of 
the National Sorghum Producers Legislative Committee and the Vice President of the National 
Sorghum Producers board of directors, Dan Atkisson, testified to the House Subcommittee on 
General Farm Commodities and Risk Management: 
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The National Sorghum Producers believes in the need for a strong and reliable Title I safety 
net that is appropriately balanced and provides assistance when and where it is needed.  
One very real problem with the current policy that is felt very acutely in times like this has 
to do with something as simple as the timing of payments and the problem this poses for 
farmers trying to cash flow.  The National Sorghum Producers asks you to consider moving 
up the timing of Farm Bill assistance, so the support is put in the hands of farmers earlier 
than a full calendar year following the crop year it is meant to cover.  (National Sorghum 
Producers, pp 5).  
 
However, in recent years, the only way for many farmers to reach a positive cash flow is 
by including their expected program support payments.  Unfortunately, “current federal banking 
regulations are not allowing banks to include this expected payment because the year-long 
discovery period for the 2017 average marketing year price does not begin until after harvest and 
is considered too far in the future and speculative to be included” (National Barley Growers 
Association, pp 2).  If producers are not able to prove that their farm will produce a positive cash 
flow, and they have no other capital that can be included, they could be denied an operating loan.  
Without money upfront, many producers could be put out of business.   
The consensus among American producers is that the current Title I safety net programs 
are effective and are working as they were designed.  However, due to steadily declining crop 
prices and difficult agricultural economic times, there is a growing need for improvement to 
these policies.  The inability to include the safety net payments in their annual operating budgets, 
due to lender concerns, has negatively affected farmers nationwide.  As a result, legislators are 
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seeking to find a solution to the Title I payment timing issues rather than a replacement of the 
entire policy.     
Many farm programs have been studied to analyze the effects of replacing current farm 
programs with a different type of revenue guarantee program.  However, there have been no 
studies completed to analyze the effects of changing the way the price series in the current 
revenue guarantee program is calculated to move up the timing of safety net payments.   
Objectives of this Research 
The primary objective of this research is to evaluate alternative payment timing options by 
calculating a new price for determining PLC and ARC payments.  Four price series alternatives 
will be used to calculate the MYA prices for each covered commodity, each will then be 
compared against the baseline price series (the current 12-month MYA price).  The proposed 
analysis will be done to determine an alternative price series that will allow producers and 
lending institutions a method to accurately estimate the commodity program payments from PLC 
and ARC earlier than the current system.   
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
PLC and ARC are revenue-based support programs which were implemented by the 2014 Farm 
Bill.  All evidence, from both farmers and lawmakers, shows that the programs have effectively 
done their job of only providing farmers with support when it is needed.  Because ARC and PLC 
have worked so well, policymakers want to not only work with farmers to keep the current price 
support programs, but also address their concerns about the timing of program payments to 
improve the upcoming 2018 Farm Bill.  The literature on farm revenue programs is extensive, 
however, there has been no research conducted analyzing the effects of changing how the price 
series in the current revenue guarantee program is calculated to move up the timing of safety net 
payments.   
History  
2010 through 2014 were years of growth and prosperity in the American agricultural sector.  
This period was driven by high commodity prices and rising property values, as well as increased 
amounts of agricultural exports.  After the most recent farm bill was passed in 2014, the U.S. 
agricultural sector’s financial outlook has been in a downward spiral.  Natural disasters like 
Hurricanes Maria, Irma and Harvey and low commodity prices across the country, have caused a 
downturn in the farm economy (Drafting the Next Farm Bill).  “Net farm income has dropped 
nearly 50 percent over the last four years, the largest, four-year percentage drop since the Great 
Depression” (Drafting the Next Farm Bill).   
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The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) and the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) project that market prices for corn, soybeans, barley, and 
sunflowers will decrease for the next one to two years (FAPRI 2018).  All other covered 
commodities are predicted to either keep the same MYA price or increase slightly (FAPRI 
2018).  Because commodity prices are predicted to drop even lower than in recent years, 
producers will rely even more heavily on safety net payments.   
ACR-CO and PLC Commodity Programs Design and Operation  
The 2014 Farm Bill mandated that farmers make a one-time choice between PLC and ARC that 
will last the life of the farm bill (2014-2018).  Additionally, under ARC, producers must also 
choose between county-based (ARC-CO) or individual coverage (ARC-IC) options.  Because 
ARC-IC has such a small participation percentage (less than one percent), this research will only 
discuss ARC-CO.  ARC and PLC each make payments based on historical “base” acres and are 
therefore decoupled from current producer planting choices.  Under the current Farm Bill, PLC 
and ARC both use the twelve-month national MYA prices for calculating program payments.  A 
complete list of commodities covered under ARC and PLC are shown in table 2.1.  Commodities 
which are included in this research include: corn, sorghum, soybeans, peanuts, canola, 
sunflowers, wheat, barley, oats, dry peas, medium grain (MG) rice, long grain (LG) rice and 
cotton1.   
 
                                                 
 
1 Cotton was not included under ARC and PLC in the 2014 Farm Bill, however, under the 2018 Farm Bill it is now 
ARC and PLC eligible.   
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Table 2.1 Farm Safety Net Programs  
 
Source: Reprinted form. Johnson, Renee (2017). Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill (CRS Report No. 
R44784). Retrieved from: www.nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads//assets/crs/IF10638.pdf; p. 13.  
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Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC-CO) 
ARC was designed to be a “shallow-loss” revenue program, meaning, “it addresses the 
smaller revenue losses typically not covered under the Federal Crop Insurance program 
(programs that cover the “deep losses” potentially felt by producers)” (O’Donoghue et al. 1).  
Under ARC-CO, the county benchmark revenue for the crop is defined as the five-year Olympic 
moving average county yield times the five-year Olympic moving average MYA price or the 
reference price, whichever is higher (Crop Commodity Programs).  The per-acre county revenue 
guarantee is 86 percent of the county benchmark revenue.  Therefore, payments are issued to 
producers if the actual county revenue falls below the county revenue guarantee.  The payment is 
capped at 10 percent of the county revenue benchmark and is only provided for 85 percent of 
base acres (Crop Commodity Programs).   
ARC-CO Equations:  
Benchmark Yields = Prior 5-year Olympic Moving Average County Yield (dropping the 
high and low years and averaging the remaining 3 years) 
Benchmark Prices = Prior 5-year National Olympic Moving Average MYA Price 
(dropping the high and low years and averaging the remaining 3 years) 
County Benchmark Revenue = Prior 5-year National Olympic Moving Average MYA 
Price * Prior 5-year Olympic Moving Average County Yield (dropping the high and low 
years and averaging the remaining 3 years) 
Actual County Revenue = Actual Average County Yield * Max (National MYA Price or 
Reference Price) 
Guaranteed Revenue = Benchmark Revenue * 0.86 
Max Payment = Benchmark Revenue * 0.10 
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ARC Payment per acre = Min (Guarantee Revenue -  Actual Revenue) 
Final Estimated ARC Payment = ARC Payment per acre * Base Acres * 0.85 
                  
Note all equations are calculated on a commodity-by-commodity basis 
Price Loss Coverage (PLC) 
PLC was designed to provide support for farmers to mitigate losses from low commodity 
prices.  The 2014 Farm Bill established a reference price for each covered commodity, which 
was set to reflect the cost of production2.  The effective price for the specific covered commodity 
is the higher of either the MYA price or the national average loan rate.  PLC payments are issued 
when the effective price of a covered commodity is less than the reference price for that 
commodity (ARC/PLC Program).  The difference between the two is known as the payment rate.  
Payments are calculated by multiplying the payment rate by the commodity base acres, the 
producer’s historical payment yield and 85 percent of the planted acres. 
PLC Equations: 
Effective Price = Max (Loan Rate or MYA price) 
Payment Rate = Reference Price – Effective Price 
PLC Payment = Payment Rate * Base Acres * PLC Yield (per acre) * 0.85 
 
Note all equations are calculated on a commodity-by-commodity basis 
                                                 
 
2 Reference prices are fixed for the life of the farm bill, 2014-2018.   
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The U.S. fiscal year (FY) is a twelve-month accounting cycle, beginning October 1 and 
ending September 30 of each year (Glossary).  Spending that occurs in 2016 and 2017 (FY17), 
does not show up on the federal government’s accounting until 2018 (figure 2.1).  National 
MYA prices used in ARC and PLC calculations, are published by the USDA at the end of each 
commodity crop year (table 2.2).  Because the price component of both programs is constructed 
using MYA crop prices, program payments are issued after MYA prices are determined and after 
October 1 of the following year (Shurley and Rabinowitz).  David Schemm attests to this 
problem by saying “seed and fertilizer bills don’t wait until a year after the crop is harvested 
before they come due” (National Association of Wheat Growers).   
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Figure 2.1. Corn Fiscal Year vs Marketing Year Diagram 
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Table 2.2 U.S. Average Field Crop Marketing Years, Planting Seasons & Payment Months 
for Covered Commodities
 
Source: United States; Department of Agriculture; Farm Service Agency; Understanding 
ARC/PLC; 4 Oct. 2016. 
 
 
Commodity price declines in recent years have led to higher debt-to-asset ratios for most 
producers (figure 2.2).  The ability for producers to obtain operating loans in recent years has 
been challenging.  A Kansas State University agricultural economics professor, Art Barnaby, 
advised, “farmers could better work with banks on operating loans if USDA would release 
county yields for ARC earlier in the year.  Bankers would not know the exact amount of any 
ARC payment, but given the weighted average of the MYA price, a banker and farmer would 
have a better ballpark figure to help evaluate operating loans” (Final Market-Year Prices).   
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Figure 2.2. Producer Debt Percentage by Commodity. Reprinted form. “National 
Association of Wheat Growers the Next Farm Bill: Commodity Policy, Part 1.” 2017, p. 3. 
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“ARC revenue benchmarks are based on moving averages of prices and yields and will 
therefore fluctuate over time.  This contrasts with the fixed reference prices used to calculate 
support for the PLC program” (Crop Commodity Programs).  ARC protects producers against 
recent drops in market prices.  However, a problem arises if MYA prices continue to decline for 
multiple years.  The low prices begin to factor into the Olympic moving average, causing the 
revenue guarantee to fall.   
In 2019, producers will once again have to elect between the “certainty of fixed reference 
prices (PLC) and the flexibility of annually adjusted revenue coverage (ARC)” (Crop 
Commodity Programs).  Declining MYA prices over the last four years have eroded ARC-CO 
revenue protection.  As crop prices are expected to continue to decline in the coming years, it is 
important that payments for each crop remain set at an adequate level.  Simply stated, reference 
prices for each crop should be analyzed to determine if adjustments are needed, based on future 
predicted crop prices, to ensure appropriate levels are set for the upcoming 2018 Farm Bill.   
Numerous revenue guarantee farm programs have been analyzed using stochastic 
simulation.  However, there have been no studies completed to analyze the effects of changing 
the way the MYA price series in the current revenue guarantee program are calculated to move 
up the timing of safety net payments.   
Literature on Stochastic Simulation 
As previously stated in Chapter I, this research seeks to determine an alternative MYA price 
series capable of estimating ARC and PLC payments earlier than the current system.  To do this, 
four alternative price series will be analyzed and compared against the baseline price series.  To 
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accurately replicate real world situations into predictions, risk must be included using stochastic 
(Monte Carlo) simulation.  In farm policy analysis, the decision maker, in this case, 
policymakers and producers, needs to have the best information to be able to make informed 
decisions.  “Monte Carlo simulation continues to be the preferred tool for stress testing a 
business under risk” (Richardson 2008).   
An empirical distribution is a useful simulation tool commonly used when there is a 
limited amount of historical data.  Empirical distributions are non-parametric, meaning there is 
no set form and the frequencies in the historical data shape the distribution.  A paper written by 
Richardson, Gray, and Klose (2000), outline the procedure for including multivariate empirically 
distributed variables in a simulation model.  Since the publishing of this paper, the multivariate 
empirical (MVEMP) has become a widely accepted simulation method.   
Knapek, (2013) used a MVEMP simulation model to examine the interactions between 
current farm programs (Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) and Supplemental Revenue 
Assistance (SURE), and crop insurance) and new policy changes (drafts of ARC and PLC 
submitted by the House and Senate) for four representative farms with multiple crops.  It was the 
first of its kind to study all parts of the farm safety net, at one time, or in any combination for 
modified representative farms.  The House and Senate ARC and PLC proposals discussed by 
Knapek (2013) used the “first five-month marketing year price,” to calculate program payments.  
The research was conducted to identify any commodity or regional differences in representative 
farms and to capture the true risks faced by farmers all over the country.   
Similarly, Higgins, et al. (2007) used a stochastic simulation model to analyze the farm 
level economic impacts associated with implementing a new revenue-based farm safety net 
program for the 2007 Farm Bill.  Thirteen different representative crop farms, maintained by the 
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Agricultural and Food Policy Center (AFPC), were simulated to determine the magnitude and 
frequency of government payments for each farm policy.   
The research using stochastic simulation in agriculture policy is a great starting point, 
however, the existing literature could be expanded to include adjusting the current revenue 
guarantee program calculation to be more efficient.  Future economic implications of the 
potential gain to American farmers has not been extensively analyzed.  However, the ability for 
farmers to accurately predict payments in a timely manner to include them when cash flowing 
would have many potential advantages.  This is a first of its kind attempt to analyze alternative 
MYA price series calculations, and the effects on government payments and producer welfare by 
moving up timing of program payments.   
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Monte-Carlo (stochastic) simulation is the preferred method for ranking risky alternatives and is 
a common method used in farm policy analysis.  In a farm-level risk assessment and policy 
analysis, Richardson, Klose, and Gray (2000) outline using a MVEMP simulation model to 
include crop price and yield risk into simulated outcomes.  “Agricultural issues are particularly 
suitable for analysis with Monte Carlo simulation because of the strong influence of weather and 
price risks on agriculture” (Richardson 2013).  Ignoring risk in a farm policy model leads to 
inaccurate point estimate forecasts of the stochastic input variables being estimated.  Stochastic 
simulation incorporates these unknown risk factors into the simulated key output variables 
(KOV’s), producing an accurate range of forecasted possible outcomes.   
Stochastic Simulation 
The stochastic simulation model created for this analysis was designed using SIMETAR©, a 
Microsoft Excel add-inn.  This research seeks to analyze alternative payment timing options for 
calculating a new price to determine PLC and ARC-CO payments.  Four alternative MYA price 
series will be calculated and compared to the baseline price series for each covered commodity 
previously mentioned in Chapter II.  Price and production risk will be included by using a 
multivariate empirical model (MVEMP) probability distribution to simulate these two stochastic 
variables.  Random variables will be simulated 500 times to estimate probability distributions for 
KOV’s and allow for a robust evaluation of the alternative payment timing options and the 
impact on ARC and PLC payments.   
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Stochastic Variables  
“Stochastic variables are the variables the decision maker cannot forecast with accuracy” 
(Richardson 2013).  Crop prices and production are the stochastic variables in the model.  Both 
price and production are stochastic because they are determined by exogenous variables such as 
market conditions and weather and are, therefore, unable to be controlled by farmers and policy 
makers.  Risk for a farm policy analysis is information that is beyond the producers control 
(Richardson, et al.  2008.).  Stochastic prices and production are used to calculate many 
equations in the model, such as MYA prices and program costs, thus making those equations 
stochastic as well.  Historical data3, years 2003 through 2016, were collected from the United 
States Department of Agriculture’s National Agriculture Statistics Service (USDA NASS) and 
used to calculate alternative MYA prices for each program crop (2017).  The projected mean 
annual price taken from the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute’s (FAPRI) 2017 
January Baseline was used to simulate the stochastic 2017 base and alternative price series’ data.  
Alternative scenarios were defined and simulated using different combinations of monthly prices 
and weights to calculate MYA prices.  Each was evaluated based on the probability of triggering 
commodity program payments.   
Baseline and Alternatives 
As previously stated in Chapter II, the current Farm Bill uses a twelve-month formula to 
calculate MYA prices for crops covered under PLC and ARC.  Although the current method has 
                                                 
 
3 Historical data obtained from NASS includes monthly prices and weights, annual total crop production, and annual 
crop yields.   
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worked well throughout the life of the 2014 Farm Bill, improvements to the timing of farm 
program payments were analyzed in preparation of the upcoming farm bill.  To determine the 
effects of the alternative price series’ formulas on farm program payment timing, the current 
twelve-month MYA formula was used as the basis for comparison in the model, for years 2003 
through 2017.  Four alternative price series’ for calculating MYA prices were suggested by the 
Chief Economist of the House Committee on Agriculture, Bart Fischer.   
For each scenario, calculations were homogeneous for all crops.  There is only 
differentiation between crops with different marketing years (table 3.1)4.  Meaning, prices and 
weights5 are the same for each month, but the weights are adjusted to a sum value of 100.   
 
 
                                                 
 
4 Table 3.1 includes all covered commodities previously mentioned, including cotton which was not previously 
eligible for ARC or PLC.   
5 A marketing weight is the proportion of the marketing year’s crop that is sold in each month.   
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Table 3.1 U.S. 2012/2013-2017/18 Marketing Year Average (MYA) Prices, MYA Price 
Publishing Dates and Units of Measurement for Covered Commodities
 
Source: Reprinted form. United States; Department of Agriculture; Farm Service Agency; 
ARC/PLC Program Data; 8 Mar. 2018; Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commodity
Marketing 
Year
Publishing Dates for 
the  Final 2017/18 
MYA Prices
Unit
Final 
2012/13 
MYA Price
Final 
2013/14 
MYA Price
Final 
2014/15 
MYA Price
Final 
2015/16 
MYA Price
Final 
2016/17 
MYA Price
Wheat Jun. 1-May 31 June 28, 2018 Bushel $7.77 $6.87 $5.99 $4.89 $3.89 $4.65 P
Barley Jun. 1-May 31 June 28, 2018 Bushel $6.43 $6.06 $5.30 $5.52 $4.96 $4.45 P
Oats Jun. 1-May 31 June 28, 2018 Bushel $3.89 $3.75 $3.21 $2.12 $2.06 $2.65 P
Peanuts Aug. 1-Jul. 31 August 29, 2018 Pound $0.3010 $0.2490 $0.2200 $0.1930 $0.1970 $0.2150 P
Corn Sep. 1-Aug. 31 September 27, 2018 Bushel $6.89 $4.46 $3.70 $3.61 $3.36 $3.35 P
Grain Sorghum Sep. 1-Aug. 31 September 27, 2018 Bushel $6.33 $4.28 $4.03 $3.31 $2.79 $3.15 P
Soybeans Sep. 1-Aug. 31 September 27, 2018 Bushel $14.40 $13.00 $10.10 $8.95 $9.47 $9.30 P
Dry Peas Jul. 1-Jun. 30 September 27, 2018 Pound $0.1570 $0.1460 $0.1200 $0.1280 $0.1100 $0.1190 P
Sunflower Seed Sep. 1-Aug. 31 November 29, 2018 Pound $0.2540 $0.2140 $0.2170 $0.1960 $0.1740 $0.1750 P
Cotton Aug. 1-Jul. 31 October 30, 2018 Bushel - - - - - -
Canola Jul. 1-Jun. 30 September 27, 2018 Pound $0.2650 $0.2060 $0.1690 $0.1560 $0.1660 $0.1750 P
Rice (long grain) Aug. 1-Jul. 31 October 30, 2018 Pound $0.1450 $0.1540 $0.1190 $0.1110 $0.0964 $0.1170 P
Rice (med/short grain) 2/ Aug. 1-Jul. 31 October 30, 2018 Pound $0.1470 $0.1570 $0.1440 $0.1120 $0.1010 $0.1190 P
Rice (temperate japonica) Oct. 1-Sep. 30 January 2019 Pound $0.1840 $0.2070 $0.2160 $0.1810 $0.1410 $0.1600 P
MYA Price=national average price received by producers during the 12-month marketing year.
2/  Medium/short grain excludes temperate japonica rice.
1/  Final MYA prices--Source:  National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), Agricultural Prices on the publishing dates.  P=Projected MYA prices--Source:  USDA's World 
Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates report or Interagency Commodity Estimates Committee Minutes.  MYA price projections are the mid-point of the price forecast 
range, when applicable.
Projected 
2017/18 MYA 
Price
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September-August Marketing Year 
For the commodities of corn, soybeans, sorghum and sunflowers, the marketing year begins in 
September and ends in August (table 3.1), and therefore, they share the same calculations for 
MYA price.  The baseline MYA price is computed by taking the sum of the twelve weighted 
monthly percentages sold (September through August).  The equations that form the MYA 
calculation are: 
1. Monthly Percentage of Total Crop Sold= ((monthly average price * monthly weight sold) 
* 100) 
2. Average Prices Received= sum of all monthly percentages of total crop sold  
 
Four alternative payment timing scenarios for calculating MYA prices are evaluated to 
calculate PLC and ARC payments.  Alternative one uses the first five (F5) monthly marketing 
values of each marketing year to calculate the MYA prices.  Alternative two is calculated using 
the last seven months of the current year and the first five months of the upcoming year (L7F5).  
Alternative three uses monthly marketings beginning in January of the current marketing year 
and continues through the next entire crop year (LJTF12).  Lastly, alternative four uses the last 
twelve months of the current year and the first five months of the next year (L12F5) (totaling 17 
months).  Each scenario is then compared to the baseline on a commodity by commodity basis.   
The first alternative formula uses only the first five monthly marketing values 
(September-January) of each marketing year to calculate the MYA prices.  The following steps 
are used to calculate the MYA price for F5.        
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1. Monthly marketings6 are simulated for each of the five months using the FAPRI 
2017 forecasted mean and a stochastic forecast of the seasonal index of prices for 
the crop.   
2. Weighted monthly percentages are found by dividing the monthly marketing in 
month one (September) by the total of the first five monthly marketings 
(September-January).  Stochastic monthly sales are simulated using FAPRI 2017 
forecasts of production and a stochastic fractional index of monthly marketings 
for the crop. 
3. Weighted monthly prices are simulated by multiplying the stochastic marketing 
weights by their corresponding average monthly price indices and stochastic 
annual price.   
4. The weighted monthly prices (September-January) are summed to get the ‘first 
five-month’ MYA prices 
 
The second alternative is calculated using the last seven months of the current year and 
the first five months of the next marketing year (February-August, September-January).  The 
third alternative, uses monthly marketings beginning in January of the previous marketing year, 
continuing through the next entire marketing year (January-August, September-August).  For 
corn, sorghum, soybeans and sunflowers, there are a total of twenty marketing months included 
                                                 
 
6 Monthly marketings are the total physical number of bushels, pounds, or hundred weight (CWT) sold in each 
month.  Each is calculated by multiplying the annual crop production by the monthly weight and dividing by 100.  
Monthly marketings are computed as the first step in each alternative price series.   
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(between January and September, there are eight months, plus the next twelve months, equaling 
20).  This number differs for each crop depending on what month the crop marketing year 
begins.  Alternative four (L12F5) uses the last twelve months of the current year and the first five 
months of the next year (totaling 17 months).   
 
August-July Marketing Year 
Peanuts, cotton, long grain (LG) and medium grain (MG) rice share a marketing year that begins 
in August and ends in July, as such, the calculations for the MYA price are the same.  The 
baseline MYA price is computed by taking the sum of the twelve weighted monthly percentages 
sold (August through July).  The first alternative formula uses only the first five monthly 
marketing values (August-December) of each marketing year to calculate the MYA prices.  The 
second alternative is calculated using the last seven months of the current year and the first five 
months of the upcoming year (January-July, August-December).  The third alternative uses 
monthly marketings beginning in January of the previous marketing year and continues through 
the next entire marketing year (January-August, September-August).  For peanuts, cotton, LG, 
MG trice, there are a total of nineteen marketing months included (between January and July, 
there are seven months, plus the next twelve months, equaling 19).  Alternative four (L12F5) 
uses the last twelve months of the current year and the first five months of the next year (totaling 
17 months).   
 
July-June Marketing Year  
The marketing year for both Canola and dry peas begins in July and ends in June; therefore, the 
calculations for MYA price are the same as well.  The baseline MYA price is computed by 
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taking the sum of the twelve weighted monthly percentages sold (July through June).  The 
formula for F5, uses only the first five monthly marketing values (July-November) of each 
marketing year to calculate the MYA prices.  The second alternative was calculated using the last 
seven months of the current year and the first five months of the upcoming year (December-June, 
July-November).  The third alternative uses monthly marketings beginning in January of the 
previous marketing year and continues through the next entire marketing year (January-June, 
July-June).  For canola and dry peas, there are eighteen marketing months included (there are six 
months between January and June, plus the next twelve months, equaling 18).  Alternative four 
(L12F5) uses the last twelve months of the current year and the first five months of the next year 
(totaling 17 months).   
 
June-May Marketing Year  
Wheat, barley and oats each have marketing years beginning in June and ending in May, because 
of this, their calculations for MYA price are the same.  The baseline MYA price was computed 
by taking the sum of the twelve weighted monthly percentages sold (June through May).  The 
first alternative formula uses only the first five monthly marketing values (June-October) of each 
marketing year to calculate the MYA prices.  The second alternative was calculated using the last 
seven months of the current year and the first five months of the upcoming year (November-
May, June-October).  The third alternative uses monthly marketings beginning in January of the 
previous marketing year and continues through the next entire marketing year (January-May, 
June-May).  For wheat, barley and oats, there are a total of seventeen marketing months included 
(between January and May, there are five months, plus the next twelve months, equaling 17).  
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Alternative four (L12F5) uses the last twelve months of the current year and the first five months 
of the next year (totaling 17 months).   
Simulating MYA Prices 
To determine the probability of triggering government safety net payments, risk must be 
included in the calculation.  As such, a stochastic simulation model is used to sample the 
stochastic variables probability distribution functions (PDF’s)7.  Once the variables were 
simulated, validation and verification tests were performed on the results.  Results exposed 
significant seasonal variability and correlation among the simulated historical variables.   
To accurately estimate the parameters for the PDF’s, the seasonal variability in the data 
must first be removed to isolate the actual risk for the stochastic variables.  The seasonal pattern 
in the prices and production was removed using a seasonal price index and a fractional 
contribution index to simulate the stochastic variables.  Therefore, a seasonal price index (SPI) 
and a fractional contribution index (FCI) were used to forecast stochastic 2017 monthly prices 
and weights for marketing each crop.  Stochastic monthly prices and weights were simulated 
using the January 2018 FAPRI baseline8 prices and production as the average and a stochastic 
index for each crop.  Additional information on SPI and FCI calculations can be found in 
Appendix A.   
Stochastic MYA prices for the base and each alternative price series were simulated 
using the stochastic monthly prices and their associated weights.  In other words, under F5, the 
                                                 
 
7 A PDF is a “schedule of probabilities associated with alternative values of a random variable, for example a 
histogram or bell-shaped curve” (Richardson, 2013).   
8 FAPRI 2018 predicted baseline annual prices and production were used to provide more accurate forecasts.   
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stochastic monthly corn prices for September through January 2017 became the stochastic MYA 
prices for 2017.   
Prices and production are inversely related, therefore, if the model is correct, they should 
be negatively correlated.  If the negative correlation between prices and yields is ignored, the 
means will be biased, and the risk will be overstated for the key output variables (KOV’s) 
(Richardson 2013).  To insure the correlation is appropriately incorporated, a SIMETAR© 
function, multivariate empirical model (MVEMP) as percent deviations from trend was used.  
Because there is an insufficient amount of historical data available, a non-parametric empirical 
distribution was used to estimate the parameters.  An empirical distribution has a minimum and 
maximum which allows the data to determine the shape of the distribution.  Using percent 
deviations from trend when simulating stochastic variables, ensures that the result will be 
coefficient of variation stationary.     
Stochastic 2017 MYA prices and production for each price series (forecasted means) and 
a trend forecasted yield were simulated using the MVEMP function.  To accurately determine 
the probability of triggering program payments, each random monthly price was simulated using 
its historical risk and the underlying uniform standard deviate (USD’s) was the same for each 
scenario.  As a result, the base and each alternative price series were compared without bias 
caused by using different USD’s for each scenario.  The random variables were simulated and 
produced separate probability distributions for each of the 2017 monthly prices and weights.  
The model simulated the forecasted values, for 500 possible iterations or possible outcomes and 
summary statistics were calculated.  
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Validation and Verification  
After the variables were simulated, the model was verified for accuracy and correctness by 
checking equations and ensuring all variables were used appropriately.  A series of statistical 
validation tests were run on the simulated variables to ensure they are statistically equal to their 
historical data.  “Statistical testing of the simulated distributions is required to determine whether 
the stochastic variables in the model are statistically different from the associated historical data” 
(Richardson, J. et al.  2008).  First, a Student’s t-test was performed to test the null hypothesis 
that the forecasted means are statistically equal to the simulated means.  An F test was also run 
on each variable to test the variance of the simulated data verses the historical data.   
The model used a SPI and a FCI to simulate the forecasted 2017 means instead of using 
means from historical data.  As a result, a test parameters validation test was used to test if the 
simulated means are statistically equal to the forecasted assumed means.  Similarly, a Student’s 
t-test was used to test the MVEMP model for correlation at the 99th percent level; this was done 
using the historical correlation matrix used to calculate the CUSD’s, and the simulated variables 
to determine if their correlation coefficients are statistically equivalent.  Results of the validation 
tests conclude that the MVEMP model is correct and the simulated variables accurately replicate 
the relationships represented in the original forecasted data series.   
Stochastic MYA prices were used in the PLC and ARC-CO payment formulas to 
simulate total U.S. producer payments by crop.  The purpose of the simulation is to estimate the 
probability distribution of payments for the base and alternative formulas for calculating MYA 
prices.  The summary statistics for the probability distributions were compared by crop to 
determine the effects of each alternative formula on PLC and ARC payments.   
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Key Output Variables (KOVs)  
1. Forecasted 2017 MYA prices for the baseline and alternatives 
2. 2017 forecasted ARC government payments 
3. 2017 forecasted PLC government payments 
The variables were simulated, generating the probability distributions for each of the 
KOV’s.  Summary statistics for each of the KOV’s were calculated and used to create ARC and 
PLC stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) graphs.  SERF analysis was used to 
determine the decision makers’ rankings of risky alternatives.   
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
The analysis was conducted for thirteen covered commodities described in Chapters II and III, 
for the current 12 month marketing year baseline and four alternative MYA price scenarios:  
First Five (F5), Last Seven First Five (L7F5), the Start Last January to First 12 (LJTF12) and the 
Last Twelve First 5 (L12F5).  Stochastic 2017 MYA prices and stochastic 2017 government 
payments for both ARC and PLC were simulated through a total of 500 iterations, for all thirteen 
crops.   
This section uses means, maximums and minimums, as well as stochastic efficiency with 
respect to a function (SERF) charts to explain results and their effects on program payment 
timing and preferences.  ARC and PLC payments were determined using the current 2014 Farm 
Bill baseline calculation method, and for each of the four alternative MYA price series formulas.  
A SERF analysis of the program payments of each price series scenario was presented to 
compare and rank taxpayer and producer preferences.  An annual program payment comparison 
table was used to summarize the differences between estimated ARC and PLC payments under 
the baseline and each price series.   
Stochastic 2017 MYA Price Results 
The base and each alternative price series’ stochastic 2017 MYA prices were simulated together 
to forecast the 2017 MYA prices.  As previously discussed, the purpose of this analysis is to find 
the alternative that best replicates the baseline to calculate payments.  Therefore, the same  
30 
reference prices are assumed for each price series, to ensure that the only difference between the 
projected ARC and PLC payments are the formulas to calculate the MYA prices.  Table 4.1 is a 
side-by-side comparison of the base and the four alternative calculations estimated using the 
2017 MYA prices.  The mean prices in table 4.1 are the average annual MYA crop prices for 
each alternative price series.  The analysis shows the MYA prices, under each alternative price 
series.   
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To test the probable farmer preferences, one must analyze how ARC and PLC parameters 
are affected by alternative MYA price series.  Stochastic 2017 ARC and PLC government 
payments were simulated for the baseline and each alternative MYA price series calculation 
methods.   
Results for the Baseline 
The baseline MYA prices were simulated using a MVEMP as percent deviations from trend to 
simulate the 2017 ARC and PLC payments for each crop.  Table 4.2 shows the results of the 
baseline simulation.   
The means represent the projected average government payments paid to farmers for 
ARC and PLC.  The largest projected government payments for ARC in 2017 were for corn.  
This is not surprising because over 93% of corn base acres are enrolled in ARC, ($90 million 
acres) additionally, corn prices are also relatively low compared to the reference price.  The 
lowest ARC payment was for long grain rice due in part to the number of base acres and low 
ARC participation.  Peanuts remained unchanged with no ARC payments made due to zero 
participation9.  The highest PLC mean payment was for wheat and the lowest was for medium 
grain rice.   
The probability of triggering (frequency of payments) an ARC or PLC payment under the 
baseline was also calculated for each crop (table 4.2).  PLC has an overall higher probability of 
triggering a payment (excluding cotton and peanuts) between 40% to 88% compared to ARC, 
9 Peanuts had a national 0.3% participation rate under ARC therefore, for simplicity purposes, a 0% participation 
rate was used in this analysis.   
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which has a frequency of payments percentage between 19% to 68%.  This was expected, as low 
prices over the past four years have caused ARC’s revenue guarantee to decline while PLC 
reference prices have remained constant.  The average total payment size under ARC ($4,335 
million) is double that of PLC ($2,709.82 million).  Overall, baseline PLC payments are issued 
more often than ARC payments, however, when ARC payments do trigger, they are usually 
much larger than PLC.   
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Table 4.2. Baseline Results of ARC and PLC for Each Covered Commodity (In Millions of Dollars) 
Corn Soybeans Sorghum Wheat Peanuts LG Rice MG Rice 
ARC Mean 2,964.4$  861.2$  37.4$  422.5$  -$  0.1$  7.4$  
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$   
Max 4,985$  2,256$  64$  814$  -$  1$  24$  
% time paid 65% 41% 68% 59% 0% 32% 64%
PLC Mean 442.5$  23.5$  296.9$  2,303.8$  256.9$  593.5$  0.1$  
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$   
Max 1,026$  84$  619$  2,304$  494$  1,043$  0$  
% time paid 71% 40% 79% 69% 86% 88% 62%
Barley Canola Oats Peas Sunflowers Cotton Total
ARC Mean 19.5$  0.1$  12.5$  2.1$  8.4$       -$  4,335.6$  
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  15$  
Max 44$  1$  23$  11$  19$  -$  8,228$  
% time paid 54% 19% 60% 51% 55% 0%
PLC Mean 109.9$  63.7$  6.0$  2.2$  37.8$  -$  2,709.8$  
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  402$  
Max 272$  118$  21$  11$  82$  -$  5,136$  
% time paid 73% 81% 54% 57% 66% 0%
Results for Alternative 1: The First Five Marketing Year 
Alternative one (F5) was simulated using the first five monthly marketings to calculate the 
annual MYA commodity prices.  This section summarizes the changes in ARC and PLC 
payments for alternative F5, compared to the baseline.  The ARC payment frequency and the 
magnitude of payments increased for most crops compared to the base (table 4.3).  Under F5, the 
average ARC frequency increased 3%.  The only crop that decreased in frequency of payments 
was medium grain rice, by 2%.  Also, the average change in ARC payments for corn increased 
almost $300 million; wheat and soybeans also had large increases of $93 million and $77 million 
respectively.  In PLC under F5, long grain rice had a loss of $62 million annually.  In contrast, 
wheat experienced the largest increase in mean PLC payments (over $161 million).   
Under the F5 marketing year, ARC payments totaled $4,812 million, which is an increase 
of almost $476 million from the total baseline payments.  Total PLC payments were $2,907 
million, which is about $197 million greater than the baseline total of $2,118.9 million (Tables 
4.2 & 4.3).  Table 4.3 shows that the F5 MYA price calculation, compared to the base, increases 
taxpayer spending on ARC and PLC payments by a total of $673 million annually.   
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Table 4.3. First Five Marketing Year Results of ARC and PLC for Each Covered Commodity (In Millions of Dollars) 
Corn Soybeans Sorghum Wheat Peanuts LG Rice MG Rice 
ARC Mean 3,267$   938$   39$   516$   -$  0$   6$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$   
Max 5,027$   2,249$   63$   829$   -$  1$  25$   
% time paid 73% 48% 72% 68% 0% 32% 62%
Change from Base Mean 302.88$   77.23$   1.74$   93.05$   -$  0.02$   (1.01)$   
% time paid 9% 7% 4% 9% 0% 0% -2%
PLC Mean 489$   30$   332$   2,465$   281$   531$   0$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$   
Max 1,083$   90$   665$   -$  536$  1,093$   0$   
% time paid 79% 42% 84% 78% 86% 88% 30%
Change from Base Mean 46.90$   6.74$   35.56$   161.50$   24.09$   (62.11)$   (0.03)$   
% time paid 7% 3% 5% 10% 1% 0% -32%
Barley Canola Oats Peas Sunflowers Cotton Total
ARC Mean 21$   0$   13$   2$   8$   -$  4,812$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  51$   
Max 45$  1$  23$  5$  18$  -$  8,284$   
% time paid 58% 27% 62% 53% 58% 0%
Change from Base Mean 1.52$   0.03$   0.85$   0.02$   0.00$   -$  476.33$   
% time paid 4% 7% 2% 2% 3% 0%
Mean 118$   71$   7$   3$   46$   -$  2,907$   
PLC Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  385$   
Max 293$  134$  23$  12$  89$  -$  5,428$   
% time paid 71% 86% 56% 59% 81% 0%
Change from Base Mean 7.92$   6.88$   0.59$   1.21$   8.34$   -$  196.75$   
% time paid -2% 4% 3% 2% 16% 0%
Results for Alternative Two: Last 7 First 5 Month Marketing Year 
Alternative two (L7F5) used the last seven, and the first five monthly marketing values of the 
marketing year to calculate MYA commodity prices.  The results in Table 4.4 show how each 
crop, simulated under ARC and PLC programs, respond to the L7F5 MYA calculation when 
compared to the unchanged base.   
The ARC payment frequency and magnitude of payments increased for all crops except 
for barley (Tables 4.2 & 4.4).  On average, ARC frequency increased 12% under L7F5 compared 
to the baseline.  Barley decreased the probability of triggering a payment by 5% and mean 
payment by $1.6 million.  Corn, wheat and soybeans had the largest ARC payment increases of 
$1,040, $248 and $158.4 million respectively.  Peanuts remained unchanged with no ARC 
payments.   
PLC saw large decreases in the size of mean payments.  The decrease was largely caused 
by long grain rice, which experienced the largest decrease in payments compared to the base of 
$516 (Tables 4.2 & 4.4).  Wheat experienced the largest increase in mean PLC payments (over 
$215 million) followed by peanuts with a $87.6 million payment increase.   
Under the L7F5 marketing year, total ARC payments were $5,795 million, which is an 
increase of almost $1,460 million from the total baseline payments.  Total PLC payments were 
$2,514 million, which is around $195 million less than the baseline total of $2,118 million 
(Tables 4.2 & 4.4).  Table 4.4 shows that the L7F5 alternative, compared to the baseline, 
substantially increases taxpayer spending on ARC and PLC by $1,264 million annually.   
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Table 4.4. Last Seven First Five (L7F5) Results of ARC and PLC for Each Covered Commodity (In Millions of Dollars) 
Corn Soybeans Sorghum Wheat Peanuts LG Rice MG Rice 
ARC Mean 4,004.4$   1,019.5$   40.1$   670.5$   -$  0.4$   13.6$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  
Max 5,564.0$   2,370.6$   67.1$  889.6$   -$  0.6$  24.6$   
% time paid 77% 59% 72% 83% 0% 64% 77%
Change from Base Mean 1,040.0$   158.4$   2.7$   248.0$   -$  0.2$   6.2$   
% time paid 12% 18% 4% 24% 0% 32% 12%
PLC Mean 412.6$   21.9$   262.1$   2,519.0$   344.5$  77.0$   63.4$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  
Max 974.3$   90.6$  653.9$   -$  616.1$  231.2$   123.3$   
% time paid 72% 33% 83% 91% 92% 58% 79%
Change from Base Mean (29.9)$  (1.6)$   (34.8)$   215.2$   87.6$  (516.5)$   63.3$   
% time paid 1% -6% 4% 22% 6% -31% 17%
Barley Canola Oats Peas Sunflowers Cotton Total
ARC Mean 17.9$   0.3$   15.6$   2.8$   9.8$  -$  5,794.9$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  45.2$   
Max 45.6$  0.9$  24.1$  5.2$  19.6$  -$  9,012.0$   
% time paid 50% 48% 69% 62% 64% 0%
Change from Base Mean (1.6)$  0.2$   3.0$   0.7$   1.4$  -$  1,459.3$   
% time paid -5% 29% 9% 12% 9% 0%
PLC Mean 77.0$   63.4$   6.5$   2.8$   39.4$  -$  2,514.7$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  563.3$   
Max 231.2$   123.3$   24.0$  11.3$  78.5$  -$  4,991.1$   
% time paid 58% 79% 59% 51% 79% 0%
Change from Base Mean (32.9)$  (0.3)$   0.5$   0.6$   1.6$  -$  (195.1)$  
% time paid -15% -2% 5% -6% 13% 0%
Results for Alternative Three: Last January to First 12 Month Marketing Year 
Alternative three (LJTF12) used monthly marketing values beginning in January of the previous 
marketing year, continuing through the next entire marketing year (January-August, September-
August) to calculate MYA commodity prices.  The results in Table 4.5 show how each crop, 
simulated under ARC and PLC programs, respond to the LJTF12 MYA calculation.   
The ARC payment frequency increased for all crops except for sorghum and barley 
(Tables 4.2 & 4.5).  The probability of triggering a payment decreased by 30% for sorghum and 
3% for barley.  There was also an average 7% increase in ARC frequency under LJTF12 
compared to the baseline (from 43% to 50% average).  The mean payments for sorghum and 
barley decreased by $15.8 million and $2.9 million.  Corn and wheat had the largest mean 
payment increases of $325.6 million and $109.5 million.   
PLC saw large drops in mean payments and the frequency of payments.  The largest 
decreases were observed for sorghum, which experienced a substantial 22% payment decrease, 
followed by corn and barley with 8% (Tables 4.2 & 4.5).  Long grain rice had the largest 
increase in mean PLC payments by $801 million, followed by wheat with a $51.6 million 
increase.   
Under LJTF12, ARC payments totaled $4,737 million, which is an increase of almost 
$304 million from the total baseline payments.  Total PLC payments were $2,835.9 million, 
which is around $717 million more than the baseline total of $2,119 million (Tables 4.2 & 4.5).  
Table 4.5 shows the LJTF12 alternative, compared to the baseline, increases taxpayer spending 
on ARC and PLC by $7,573.4 million annually.   
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Table 4.5 LJTF12 Results of ARC and PLC for Each Covered Commodity (In Millions of Dollars) 
Corn Soybeans Sorghum Wheat Peanuts LG Rice MG Rice 
ARC Mean 3,290$   839$   22$  532$   -$  0$   12$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  
Max 5,430$   2,341$   67$  839$  -$  1$  24$   
% time paid 69% 47% 39% 68% 0% 62% 80%
Change from Base Mean 326$   (22)$  (15.83)$   109$   -$  0$   12$   
% time paid 4% 6% -30% 9% 0% 30% 15%
PLC Mean 378$   18$   141$  2,355$   300$  806$   0$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  267$   -$  
Max 954$   67$   429$  -$  566$  1,136$   0$   
% time paid 62% 33% 57% 76% 88% 100% 69%
Change from Base Mean (64)$  (5)$  (156)$  52$   44$  801$   0$   
% time paid -9% -7% -22% 7% 2% 12% 7%
Barley Canola Oats Peas Sunflowers Cotton Total
ARC Mean 17$   0$   14$   2$   9$   -$  4,737$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  57$   
Max 45$  1$   24$   5$   20$   -$  8,796$   
% time paid 51% 49% 66% 59% 56% 0%
Change from Base Mean (2.92)$   0$   2$   (104)$  0$   -$  304$   
% time paid -3% 30% 6% 22% 1% 0%
PLC Mean 80$   63$   6$  3$   35$  -$  2,836$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  731$   
Max 237$  121$  22$  11$  77$  -$  5,192$   
% time paid 65% 77% 55% 56% 75% 0%
Change from Base Mean (30)$  (0)$  0$  3$   (3)$  -$  717$   
% time paid -8% -4% 2% 56% 10% 0%
Results for Alternative Four: Last 12 First 5 Month Marketing Year 
Alternative four (L12F5) used the last seven, and the first five monthly marketing values of the 
marketing year to calculate MYA commodity prices.  The results in Table 4.6 show how each 
crop, simulated under ARC and PLC programs, respond to the L12F5 MYA calculation when 
compared to the unchanged baseline.   
The ARC payment frequency increased for all crops except for barley (Tables 4.2 & 4.6).  
There was also an average 17% overall increase in ARC frequency under L12F5 compared to the 
baseline.  Barley decreased the probability of triggering a payment by 7% and the mean payment 
by almost $4.2 million.  The mean for ARC corn payments increased by $761 million under 
L12F5, followed by wheat with an increase of $208 million.  On the other hand, peas had the 
most substantial payment decrease of $104 million.   
PLC saw large increases in mean payments and frequency of payments.  Peas had the 
largest increase in payment frequency of 55%, followed by wheat and sorghum with 27% and 
21% respectively (Tables 4.2 & 4.6).  Long grain rice experienced the largest increase in mean 
PLC payments with $893 million, followed by wheat and sorghum with increases of $184 
million and $120 million.   
Under the L12F5, ARC payments totaled $5,314 million, which is a considerable 
increase of $881 million from the total baseline payments ($4,433 million).  Total PLC payments 
were $3,553 million, which is $1,434 million greater than the baseline total of $2,118.9 million 
(Tables 4.2 & 4.6).  L12F5 MYA price calculation, compared to the baseline, increases taxpayer 
spending on ARC and PLC payments by a total of $1,559.5 million annually.   
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Table 4.6 L12F5 Results of ARC and PLC for Each Covered Commodity (In Millions of Dollars) 
Corn Soybeans Sorghum Wheat Peanuts LG Rice MG Rice 
ARC Mean 3,726$   831$   63$  631$   -$  0$   15$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$   
Max 5,430$   2,341$   67$  839$  -$  1$  25$   
% time paid 74% 46% 98% 85% 0% 70% 81%
Change from Base Mean 761$   (31)$  26$  208$   -$  0$   15$   
% time paid 9% 5% 30% 25% 0% 38% 16%
PLC Mean 382$   17$  417$  2,488$   366$  898$   0$   
Min -$  -$  16$  -$  -$  523$   -$   
Max 924$   75$  684$  -$  654$  1,194$   0$   
% time paid 72% 31% 100% 96% 92% 100% 64%
Change from Base Mean (61)$  (7)$  120$  184$   109$  893$   0$   
% time paid 1% -8% 21% 27% 6% 12% 3%
Barley Canola Oats Peas Sunflowers Cotton Total
ARC Mean 15$   0$  18$  3$   11$  -$  5,314$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  81.19$   
Max 45$  1$  24$  5$  20$  -$  8,797$   
% time paid 48% 54% 87% 65% 65% 0%
Change from Base Mean (4)$  0$  6$  (104)$  2$  -$  881$   
% time paid -7% 35% 27% 27% 10% 0%
PLC Mean 71$   67$  9$  3$   38$  -$  3,553$   
Min -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  -$  1,440$   
Max 231$  120$  27$  11$  76$  -$  5,684$   
% time paid 58% 82% 70% 55% 78% 0%
Change from Base Mean (39)$  4$  3$  3$   0$  -$  1,434$   
% time paid -15% 1% 17% 55% 13% 0%
Risk Ranking Alternatives 
Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) graphs were created from the 
simulation results for each ARC and PLC MYA formulas to compare the base and alternative 
prices.  SERF analysis is a relatively transparent and straight-forward method of risk ranking that 
simultaneously ranks all alternatives.  The SERF analysis was conducted to rank producers and 
taxpayer’s preferences for each of the risky alternatives.  This section includes analysis for three 
main crops: corn, soybeans, and wheat.  SERF results for all other crops are included in 
Appendix B.   
PLC Rankings 
Figures 4.1 – 4.3 show the SERF results from ranking the risky MYA price series 
alternatives for PLC.  The SERF charts show the risk rankings for alternative risky scenarios and 
risk averse decision makers who range from risk neutral to extremely risk averse.  This analysis 
assumes decision makers (producers and taxpayers) are risk averse and will choose the 
alternative with the highest return and the lowest risk.   
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This SERF analysis uses a negative exponential utility function as well as minimum and 
maximum absolute risk aversion coefficient’s (ARAC’s).  The lower ARAC is set equal to zero 
(risk neutral) and the upper ARAC (extremely risk averse) is found by dividing the relative risk 
coefficient (4) by the expected farm net worth.  The upper ARAC value using ARC corn 
payments calculation:  
Max ARAC = (relative risk coefficient/net worth) 
= (4 / 3,141 * 10)  
= 0.0001 
For simplicity purposes, the same upper ARAC value of 0.0001 was used for all crops under 
ARC and PLC because it was found that the magnitudes changed, but the risk rankings remained 
constant when using 0.0001 for each crop. 
SERF calculates the certainty equivalent (CE) (in millions of dollars) for each risky 
alternative at 25 different ARAC levels between the lower and upper ARAC’s.  The highest CE 
line is preferred at each ARAC level.  If the CE line do not cross, then all decisions for a risk 
averse decision maker prefer the alternative with the highest CE line.   Risk premiums are how 
much a decision maker would pay to move from one risky alternative to another and it visually 
displayed in the SERF charts as the vertical distance between the CE lines at each ARAC level.  
As one would expect, results show large differences in preferences between crops.  The 
F5 MYA was the alternative preferred by producers for corn and soybeans, but L12F5 was 
preferred by wheat.  Taxpayer preferences for MYA prices are assumed to be the opposite as 
they prefer lower expenditure and thus rank the CE line that is the lowest as preferred.  For corn, 
the preferred alternative for the taxpayer is L12F5, because it is the MYA price series with the 
lowest CE (figure 4.1).  This is followed by LJTF12, L7F5, the baseline and lastly F5.  
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Figure 4.1. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for corn PLC payments for 5 Scenarios for Corn.   
Figure 4.2 ranks the alternative preferences for soybeans based on total PLC payments 
for the taxpayer and farmers.  As previously stated, F5 is the preferred MYA alternative for 
soybean producers.  However, unlike corn, the taxpayer preferred price series is LJTF12.  The 
next preferred alternative is L12F5, followed by the base, L7F5 and F5, respectively.   
Figure 4.2. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for soybean PLC payments for 5 Scenarios for Soybeans.  
Taxpayer price series preferences for wheat are shown in figure 4.3.  Much different from 
corn and soybeans, the preferred MYA price alternative for wheat producers is L12F5, while the 
preferred MYA price series for the taxpayer is the wheat baseline. The baseline is followed by 
the alternative LJTF12, F5 and L7F5, respectively.  
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Figure 4.3. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for wheat PLC payments for 5 Scenarios for Wheat.   
ARC Rankings  
Figures 4.4 – 4.6 show the SERF graphs from ranking risky alternative MYA price series for 
ARC.  As one would expect, results show variation in preferences between different crops.   
However, the L7F5 was the preferred alternative for farmers three out of the three crops shown 
in this section.   
Wheat Base
Wheat F5
Wheat L7F5
Wheat LJTF12
Wheat L12F5
0.00
200.00
400.00
600.00
800.00
1,000.00
1,200.00
1,400.00
0 0.00002 0.00004 0.00006 0.00008 0.0001 0.00012
C
e
rt
ai
n
ty
 E
q
u
iv
al
e
n
t
ARAC
Wheat Base Wheat F5 Wheat L7F5 Wheat LJTF12 Wheat L12F5
48 
Figure 4.4 shows the preferred MYA price alternative for farmers and taxpayer under 
ARC.  ARC and PLC payments are calculated very differently so the preferred alternative for 
farmers and taxpayer are also very different.  The preferred alternative for corn farmers when 
calculating ARC is L7F5, while taxpayers preferred the MYA price baseline instead.  The 
baseline is followed by F5, LJTF12 and L12F5.  
Figure 4.4. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for corn ARC payments for 5 Scenarios for Corn. 
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Figure 4.5 depicts the risk rankings for soybeans.  Corn and soybean farmers have the 
same preference when calculating ARC and PLC. The preferred alternative for soybean 
producers is L7F5.  The preferred alternative for the taxpayer is L12F5 with the soybean baseline 
and LJTF12 being almost equally preferred.  
Figure 4.5. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for Soybean ARC payments for 5 Scenarios for Soybeans. 
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The preferred alternatives for wheat based on ARC payments for taxpayers and farmers 
are shown in figure 4.6.  When calculating ARC, wheat farmers have the same preferred 
alternative as corn and soybean farmers, which is completely different when calculated with 
PLC.  The preferred MYA price alternative for wheat farmers is L7F5, while taxpayers preferred 
the wheat baseline.  When calculating ARC, the wheat and corn preferred alternatives are 
identical even though they both have different marketing years.  
Figure 4.6. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for wheat ARC payments for 5 Scenarios for Wheat.   
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Table 4.7 is a summarization of producer and taxpayer rankings of each alternative MYA 
price series for all 13 crops for PLC and ARC.  There is a lot of differentiation between the crop 
preferences, making it difficult to find a clear-cut preferred alternative for both producers and 
taxpayers.  The baseline scenario under ARC and PLC, was preferred by the taxpayers for 8 out 
of 13 crops (no other alternative was close).  Producers preferences were not so straightforward.  
Under ARC and PLC, producers ranked the L12F5 scenario first for 9 out of 13 crops.   
With the interest of lowering the federal budget, taxpayers, prefer the baseline MYA 
price scenario, for ARC and PLC because it is the least costly alternative.  While most farmers 
prefer the L12F5 alternative MYA price scenario, as it has the highest ARC and PLC program 
payments.  The purpose was to find one MYA price series that producers and taxpayers could 
agree on for every crop, under ARC and PLC.  Therefore, because there was not one single 
alternative that both parties could agree upon, no conclusions can be drawn at this point, and 
farther analysis is needed.   
Because no single alternative was unanimously agreed upon, farther analysis was 
conducted to get producers perspectives on the decision.  To get input from producers, the results 
of this research were presented to various national farm associations and agricultural interest 
groups by the Chief Economist for the House Agricultural Committee, Bart Fischer.  Results 
showed that for each crop, farmers would benefit by switching from the baseline to any of the 
four MYA price series alternatives because ARC and PLC payments would be received sooner 
and would be larger.   
Despite seeing that they would benefit by switching from the baseline, producers still 
chose the baseline MYA price series.  It is inferred that farmers are extremely risk averse.  This 
is proven by the fact that they would rather take a smaller but familiar amount of money farther 
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in the future, than have a larger but uncertain amount of money sooner.  This decision tells a lot 
about how farmers feel about risk.  Because although they saw that for every crop, under each 
alternative, they would receive larger payments sooner than they would under the baseline, they 
still chose to risk the possibility of going bankrupt waiting to receive government payments (14 
months after harvest) rather than face the risk and uncertainty associated with new policy.   
The purpose of this research was to find one MYA price series alternative that was 
unanimously preferred by both producers and taxpayers.  However, there was no alternative that 
was found to be unanimously preferred by the taxpayers and farmers.  Therefore, additional 
research conducted by the Chief Economist of the House Agricultural Committee found that the 
current 12-month baseline is preferred by both taxpayers and producers.  Furthermore, the 
baseline MYA price series will be used in the upcoming 2018 Farm Bill to calculate ARC and 
PLC payments.    
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Table 4.7 SERF Producer and Government Rankings Preferences 
PLC Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt.
1st F5 L12F5 F5 LJTF12 L12F5 Base L12F5 LJTF12 F5 Base
2nd Base LJTF12 L7F5 L12F5 L7F5 LJTF12 F5 L7F5 L12F5 LJTF12
3rd L7F5 L7F5 Base Base F5 F5 Base Base L7F5 L7F5
4th LJTF12 Base L12F5 L7F5 LJTF12 L7F5 L7F5 F5 LJTF12 L12F5
5th L12F5 F5 LJTF12 F5 Base L12F5 LJTF12 L12F5 Base F5
ARC Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt.
1st L7F5 Base L7F5 L12F5 L7F5 Base L12F5 LJTF12 L12F5 Base
2nd L12F5 F5 F5 Base L12F5 F5 L7F5 Base LJTF12 F5
3rd LJTF12 LJTF12 LJTF12 LJTF12 LJTF12 LJTF12 F5 F5 L7F5 L7F5
4th F5 L12F5 Base F5 F5 L12F5 Base L7F5 F5 LJTF12
5th Base L7F5 L12F5 L7F5 Base L7F5 LJTF12 L12F5 Base L12F5
PLC Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt.
1st F5 LJTF12 F5 Base L12F5 Base F5 L12F5 L7F5 -
2nd L7F5 L12F5 L12F5 LJTF12 L7F5 LJTF12 Base L7F5 - -
3rd Base Base L7F5 L7F5 F5 F5 LJTF12 LJTF12 - -
4th L12F5 L7F5 LJTF12 L12F5 LJTF12 L7F5 L7F5 Base - -
5th LJTF12 F5 Base F5 Base L12F5 L12F5 F5 - L7F5
ARC Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt.
1st L12F5 F5 L12F5 Base L12F5 Base F5 L12F5 L12F5 F5
2nd L7F5 Base L7F5 F5 L7F5 F5 Base LJTF12 L7F5 Base
3rd LJTF12 LJTF12 LJTF12 LJTF12 LJTF12 LJTF12 L7F5 L7F5 LJTF12 LJTF12
4th Base L7F5 F5 L7F5 F5 L7F5 LJTF12 Base Base L7F5
5th F5 L12F5 Base L12F5 Base L12F5 L12F5 F5 F5 L12F5
PLC Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt.
1st L12F5 L7F5 L12F5 Base - -
2nd LJTF12 F5 L7F5 F5 - -
3rd Base Base LJTF12 LJTF12 - -
4th F5 LJTF12 F5 L7F5 - -
5th L7F5 L12F5 Base L12F5 - -
ARC Producers Govt. Producers Govt. Producers Govt.
1st L12F5 Base - - - -
2nd L7F5 F5 - - - -
3rd LJTF12 LJTF12 - - - -
4th F5 L7F5 - - - -
5th Base L12F5 - - - -
CottonPeanutsLG Rice
Sunflowers
SorghumWheatSoybeansCorn Canola
MG RiceBarleyOatsPeas
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Taxpayer Costs 
The baseline and four alternative MYA price series calculations were each compared to the 
Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) 2017 projected government payments.  This comparison 
was conducted to quantify the cost differences between the calculation methods.  Government 
payments are reflected in the results as the sum of each programs’ mean payment for 13 crops 
(table 4.8).  The same reference price is assumed for both the base and the alternatives with the 
only difference being the formula to calculate the MYA prices.  
Table 4.8 Average Annual Government Payments for ARC plus PLC by Crop, 2017 
Corn 2017 SB 2017 GS 2017 Wht 2017 Peanuts 2017 LGR 2017 MGR 2017
Baseline 3,407         885 334 1,299 257 594 7 
F5 3,757         969 372 1,513 281 532 6 
L7F5 4,417         1,041         302 1,815 345 77 77 
SLJTF12 3,668         857 163 1,536 300 807 12 
L12F5 4,108         847 481 1,916 366 899 15 
CBO 1,784         892 348 1,670 244 - -           
Barley 2017 Canola 2017 Oats 2017 Dry Peas 2017 Sunflowers 2017 Cot 2017 TOTALS
Baseline 129 64 19 4 46 - 7,045 
F5 139 71 20 6 55 - 7,719 
L7F5 95 64 22 6 49 - 8,310 
SLJTF12 97 64 21 5 44 - 7,573 
L12F5 86 68 27 6 49 - 8,867 
CBO 81 86 19 6 46 - 5,176 
Baseline and each alternative price series assume the same reference price
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Due to the current deflated state of the American agricultural economy and the high cost of 
production, it is becoming increasingly important for farmers to have access to credit.  Producers 
are calling on Congress to find a way to allow commodity program payments to be estimated and 
received sooner than the current system.  Policy makers need the best information possible, to 
make an informative decision as to the consequences of changing the MYA price calculation for 
PLC and ARC calculations.  The objectives of this research were to evaluate alternative payment 
timing options by calculating a new MYA price for determining PLC and ARC payments.   
A stochastic multivariate empirical simulation model was used to include price and 
production risk into the simulated outcomes.  Four alternative price series were used to simulate 
MYA prices for each covered commodity and compared against the baseline price series (the 
current 12-month MYA price).  The model was designed to provide probabilistic outcomes for 
each alternative marketing year average prices.  The model was used to analyze 13 crops under a 
baseline MYA price formula compared to four alternative MYA price formulas and used to 
calculate both ARC and PLC. 
The current 2014 MYA price formula was used as the basis for comparison in this farm 
policy analysis.  Thirteen covered commodities were analyzed under the current 12 month MYA. 
Four alternative MYA price series were calculated and compared against the baseline.  To 
determine the effects of the alternative price series’ formulas on farm program payment timing, 
the current twelve-month MYA formula was used as the basis for comparison in the model.   
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The first alternative, F5, calculates MYA prices using the first five monthly marketing 
values of the marketing year.  The second alternative, L7F5, was calculated using the last seven 
months of the current year and the first five months of the upcoming year.  The third alternative, 
LJTF12, three uses monthly marketings beginning in January of the current marketing year and 
continues through the next entire crop year.  Finally, the fourth alternative, L12F5, uses the last 
twelve months of the current year and the first five months of the next year.   
Alternative one (F5) MYA price when compared to the baseline performed well among 
the farmers.  For producers five out of the 13 crops preferred alternative F5 to the baseline and 
the other three alternatives.  When tested, this alternative was preferred by canola farmers with 
PLC, barley farmers with both PLC and ARC, soybean farmers with PLC, and corn farmers with 
PLC.  Also, when tested, the taxpayers favored alternative F5 for only two out of the 13 crops.  
Sunflowers with ARC and medium grain rice with ARC.  
Alternative two (L7F5) MYA price when compared to the baseline and the other three 
alternatives was not as preferred by farmers as alternative one (F5).  L7F5 was preferred only by 
three of the 13 crops.  Corn with ARC, wheat with ARC, and soybean with ARC.  Taxpayers did 
not prefer alternative LJTF12 for ARC or PLC for any of the crops.    
Alternative three (LJTF12) MYA price when compared to the baseline and the other 
three alternatives performed poorly for farmers.  LJTF12 was preferred by the taxpayers for three 
out of the 13 crops.  Sunflower with PLC, sorghum with both PLC and ARC, and soybeans with 
PLC.  Farmers did not prefer alternative LJTF12 over the baseline or the other three alternatives.  
Alternative four (L12F5) when compared to the baseline and the other three alternatives 
performed exceptionally for farmers.  Nine out of the 13 crops preferred L12F5 to the other 
alternatives for producers.  Sunflowers with ARC, peas with ARC, oat farmers with both PLC 
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and ARC, canola with ARC, medium grain rice farmers with ARC, long grain rice farmers with 
ARC, peanut farmers with PLC, wheat farmers with PLC, and sorghum farmers with both PLC 
and ARC.  L12F5 was preferred by taxpayers for three out of the 13 crops.  Taxpayers favored 
L12F5 for barley with both PLC and ARC, soybeans with ARC, and corn with PLC.  
Conclusions 
In the current state of the American agricultural economy, it is becoming increasingly more 
difficult for farmers to cash flow and to obtain operating loans from lenders.  For this reason, 
Congress is working to find a solution to get farmers paid quicker than they are now, under the 
current 2014 Farm Bill.  This research was conducted with the purpose of finding an alternative 
price series solution to the payment timing problems associated with the ARC and PLC 
programs.   
A series of MYA price calculations were evaluated and compared to the current baseline 
MYA price series calculation to identify effects on the timing and amount of farm program 
payments.  Results show most farmers prefer the L12F5 alternative but are overall undecided on 
which alternative they prefer.  However, in this farm policy analysis, to meet federal budgetary 
limitations, the alternative with the lowest CE is likely preferred by the taxpayers.  Therefore, 
taxpayers will prefer the current 12 month baseline MYA price series.  Because there was not 
one single alternative that both parties could agree upon, no assumptions can be drawn at this 
point, and farther analysis is needed.  
Farther analysis was conducted to get producers perspectives on the decision.  The results 
of this research were presented to various national farm associations and agricultural interest 
groups by the Chief Economist for the House Agricultural Committee, Bart Fischer.  Despite 
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seeing that they would benefit by switching from the baseline, producers still chose the baseline 
MYA price series.  It is inferred that farmers are extremely risk averse because they would rather 
have a smaller but familiar amount of money farther in the future, than have a larger but 
uncertain amount of money sooner.  Furthermore, the baseline MYA price series will be used in 
the upcoming 2018 Farm Bill to calculate ARC and PLC payments.    
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APPENDIX A 
Seasonal Price Index Equation:  
Stochastic Monthly Price Forecast n1 = [(adjusted stochastic indices month n1) * (FAPRI 
projected 2017 MYA price)] 
Note: This calculation is done for all 12 months. 
Fractional Contribution Index Equations: 
i.) Stochastic Monthly Sales Forecast n1 = [(adjusted stochastic fractional indices n1) * 
(FAPRI projected 2017 annual production)] 
ii.) Monthly Sales Weight n1= (stochastic monthly sales forecast n1 / FAPRI projected 
annual production) * 100] 
Note: These calculations are done for all 12 months. 
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APPENDIX B 
Note all certainty equivalent (CEs) are measured in millions of dollars.  
Figure B.1. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for PLC for Sorghum.    
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Figure B.2. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for ARC for Sorghum.    
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Figure B.3. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for PLC for Canola.    
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Figure B.4. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for ARC for Canola.    
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Figure B.5. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for PLC for Sunflowers.    
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Figure B.6. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for ARC for Sunflowers.    
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Figure B.7. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for PLC for Peas.    
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Figure B.8. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for ARC for Peas.    
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Figure B.9. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for PLC for Oats.    
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Figure B.10. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for ARC for Oats.    
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Figure B.11. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for PLC for Barley.    
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Figure B.12. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for ARC for Barley.    
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Figure B.13. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for PLC for MG Rice.    
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Figure B.14. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for ARC for MG Rice.    
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Figure B.15. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for PLC for LG Rice.    
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Figure B.16. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for ARC for LG Rice.    
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Figure B.17. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for PLC for Peanuts.    
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Figure B.18. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for ARC for Peanuts.    
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Figure B.19. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for PLC for Cotton.    
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Figure B.20. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) under a negative 
exponential utility function for ARC for Cotton.    
Cotton Base
Cotton F5
Cotton L7F5
Cotton LJTF12
Cotton L12F5
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0 0.00002 0.00004 0.00006 0.00008 0.0001 0.00012
C
e
rt
ai
n
ty
 E
q
u
iv
al
e
n
t
ARAC
Cotton Base Cotton F5 Cotton L7F5 Cotton LJTF12 Cotton L12F5
